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I. THE ILLEGALITY OF THE 1982 ORDINANCE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN THIS
CASE

The fact that the Canyon County Commissioners in 1982 violated state law and thereby
enacted a void herd district ordinance is critical to this appeal.

The other parties' attempt to gloss

over the fact that in 1982 the Canyon County Commissioners chose to enact a herd district wholly
outside of the statutory framework for taking such an action. The Commissioners failed to comply
with Idaho Law by failing to obtain a landowner petition and did not provide notice to the public or
provide for the required hearing prior to acting. By failing to act pursuant to a petition, the void
ordinance was flawed by failing to designate the boundaries of the district, the type of animal to
which it would apply and in failing to provide a beginning date as required by statute. Idaho Code §
25-2402 et seq.
Judge Petrie acknowledged this in his rnling stating:
Piercy contended these flaws overcome the presumption of validity of the herd district;
hence, this court must strike it down. At that time, the court did not adopt with Piercy's
position. After the benefit of a trial on the issue, and seeing firsthand how the county failed
at virtually every level to follow the Code, the court no longer disagrees with Piercy.
R. Vol. 6, p. 968. Interestingly, Judge Petrie also included the following statement in footnote no.

9:
At the time of Piercy's original motion for summary judgment, Canyon County had not
entered as a party and the other parties did not have the benefit of any "inside" information
of what the County may have done to satisfy the Code requirements. Ironically, in
hindsight, the court could just as easily have entered judgment on behalf of Piercy based
upon his original motion for summary judgment.

Id.
Piercy proved at trial that the Canyon County Commissioners violated state law in creating
the 1982 ordinance, the parties defending the ordinance want this Court to rnle that this void
ordinance is now unassailable due to the statute of limitations in I.C. § 31-857. This argument
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would allow legislative bodies to insulate their illegal acts by creating preventing challenges to
those actions after the actions have already been ruled illegal.
Even more stunning is Respondent's argmnent that all other laws, ordinances or statutes
become unassailable from any challenge after four years due to I.C. § 5-224 despite the nature or
severity of any potential defect in the law. While I.C. § 31-857 limits its effect to challenges to
procedural requirements, there is no such limitation under Respondents' interpretation of I.C. § 5224. Based upon Respondents' interpretation, I.C. § 5-224 would prevent any challenge to an
ordinance after four years unless specifically allowed in a more specific section of the Idaho Code.
Surely, the Idaho Legislature did not intend to use such a vague and blunt instrument as a catch-all
statute of limitations to categorically prevent people from challenging illegal ordinances after four
years.
Adopting the arguments of Respondents would create a legislative environment in Idaho
where legislators, county commissioners and city board members would be emboldened to
disregard procedural and substantive limits on lawmaking and pass laws in violation of the statutory
protections. As long as the government is able to keep their abuses secret long enough, then the law
would become free from challenges.
This case is the prime example. It was proven that the Canyon County commissioners
disregarded the law at "every level" in passing the 1982 Ordinance. R. Vol. 6, p. 968. Due to the
abuses of not acting according to a landowner petition and without proper notice, the people of
Canyon County had little or no chance of knowing what had occurred. Now, the Respondents want
to ignore the illegal actions of the commissioners and have the void 1982 ordinance made valid by
preventing anyone from challenging the ordinance. This method of validating illegally enacted
districts could be used by county commissioners in enacting, modifying or disbanding herd districts,
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school districts, highway districts and canal districts. Therefore, it is important in this matter to
recognize that the 1982 Ordinance was proven to have been illegally passed.

II. THE 2009 AMENDMENT TO IDAHO CODE§ 31-857 DOES NOT PREVENT MR.
PIERCY FROM CHALLENGING THE 1982 ORDINANCE
The evidence and law establish that the Idaho Legislature's 2009 amendment of I.C. § 31857 does not prevent Mr. Piercy's challenge to foe 1982 Ordinance. The 2009 amendment is not
retroactive based upon the plain language of the amendment and the evidence surrounding the
enactment of the legislation. Further, even if the 2009 amendment does apply to all previously
established herd districts, the statute of limitations created by the 2009 amendment would have
begun to nm on the date of enactment of July 1, 2009.

A.
The Plain Language of the 2009 Amendment does not Clearly Indicate an Intention
that the Statute of Limitation be Retroactive.
The amendatory language of LC. § 31-857 states "No challenge to the proceedings or
jurisdictional steps preceding such an order, shall be heard or considered after seven (7) years has
lapsed from the date of the order." This sentence is separated from the preceding sentence by a
period. The first sentence reads:
Whenever any school district, road district, herd district or other district has
heretofore been, or shall hereafter be, declared to be created, established, disestablished,
dissolved, or modified, by an order of the board of county commissioners in any county of
the state ofldaho, a legal prima facie presumption is hereby declared to exist, after a lapse of
two (2) years from the date of such order, that all proceedings and jurisdictional steps
preceding the making of such order have been properly and regularly taken so as to warrant
said board in making said order, and the burden of proof shall rest upon the party who shall
deny, dispute, or question the validity of said order to show that any such preceding
proceedings or jurisdictional steps were not properly or regularly taken; such prima facie
presumption shall be a rule of evidence in all courts in the state ofldaho.
The previously cited amended language does not use the same retroactive language as the
original sentence. Nor does the added sentence as a part of the paragraph, by its structure or
verbiage, require an interpretation that includes the retroactive language of the original sentence. It
3

is just as consistent with the structure of the paragraph to read the amendatory language as not being
retroactive.
When reading the plain language of the statute, the paragraph describes two different
statutes of limitation. The original limitation in the first sentence creates a presumption of validity
after two years have passed since the enactment of the district. This limitation makes it much more
difficult for an entity or person to challenge the validity of a district. The new statute of limitation
creates an absolute bar on challenging the validity of the districts.

A plain reading of the

amendment to I.C. § 31-857 shows that the absolute bar was not to be applied retroactively whereas
the first limitation creating a presumption does state that it is to be applied retroactively.
Idaho Code § 73-101 states, "No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared." There is no express language in the amendatory language of LC. § 31-857
that the absolute bar to recovery is to be applied retroactively. The amendatory language of I.C. §
31-857 simply does not include retroactive language. Since the express language of the amendment
does not include retroactive language, then the amendment should be applied prospectively.

B.
The Statute of Limitations in Amended LC. § 31-857 Began to Run on July 1, 2009,
Even if the Statute was Retroactively Applied to All Previous Herd Districts.
Neither Judge Ford or Respondents recognize that even if a statute of limitations is applied

retroactively, the statute will begin to run at the time of enactment or a reasonable time will be
provided to accrued cases.
The point is best illustrated by the case Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 232 P.3d 813 (2010),
that Respondent Sutton relies upon in her brief. Defendant/Respondent/Cross Appellant Jennifer
Sutton's Respondent Cross-Appellant's Brief at 26. The Supreme Court in Stuart was considering a
statute of limitations that was enacted after the Appellant's conviction as part of LC. § 19-2719.
Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 232 P.3d 813 (2010).
4

This Court analyzed some important concepts

regarding statute of limitations, holding that, "we have noted that where a statute is procedural or
merely 'draws upon facts antecedent to its enactment' it will be held to be prospective in nature." Id
at 43, 232 P.3d at 821; citing: Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 137 Idaho 307, 313, 48 P.3d 636, 642
(2002). This Court continued holding:
The original enactment of I. C. § 19-2719 included language making it applicable to
convictions prior to the statute's enactment, but it was not, itself, "retroactive" in any
substantive sense. 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 159, § 8, p. 390 ('This act shall apply to all
cases in which capital sentences were imposed on or prior to the effective date of this act but
which have not been carried out, and to all capital cases arising after the effective date of
this act.').

Id at 43, 149 Idaho at 821. The enacting language cited above is very similar to the language in
I.C. § 31-857 that Respondents argue makes the statute of limitation in the amendment to I.C. § 31857 substantively retroactive. The Respondents mistakenly attempt to make the argument that ifthe
amendment to I.C. § 31-857 applies to previously enacted herd districts then it necessarily follows
that the statute retroactively began to run on the date that the previous herd districts were enacted.
This Court in Stuart rejected that approach holding that: "As LC. § 19-2719 is a statute of
limitations, the requirement that a petition be timely filed in compliance with the requirements of
the statute began at the date of enactment for those cases involving convictions occurring at an
earlier date." Id
In holding that statutes of limitation applied retroactively to previous cases begin to run on
the date the statute of limitation was enacted, this Court in Stuart was following a long line of
authority. One such case is University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho
172, 174, 657 P.2d 469, 471 (1982). The facts in Pence are similar to those in the present case.
In Pence, Plaintiff hospital filed an application for aid for the medically indigent with the Twin
Falls County Clerk within a year of the hospital admission. The medical indigency statute, Idaho
Code § 31-3504, was then amended reducing the one-year statute to a 45-day period of
5

limitations from the date of admission to file the application. This statutory provision became
effective July 1, 1976 (1976 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 121), a time subsequent to the admission and
release of the Harrises' child from the hospital. The hospital's claim for payment was denied; suit
was filed; and summary judgment was granted to defendant. The hospital then appealed.
This Court stated:
Applied retroactively, the 1976 version of LC. § 31-3504 would have required
the application to have been made by April 10, 1976, some two and a half months before
the effective date of the law. Clearly, such retroactive application would unfairly penalize
the appellant for failure to comply with a statute of which it had no notice.
University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho at 174, 657 P.2d at 471 (1982).
This Court then quoted from Olivas v. Weiner, 127 Cal.App.2d 597, 274 P.2d 476 (1954)
as follows:
A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws upon facts existing prior to its
enactment. Thus changes in procedural law have been held applicable to existing causes
of action. The effect of such statutes is actually prospective in nature since they relate to
the procedure to be followed in the future. National Automobile & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Downey, 98 Cal.App.2d 586, 590, 220 P.2d 962; Argues v. National Superior Co., 67
Cal.App.2d 763, 778, 155 P.2d 643; Earle v. Froedtert Grain & }vfalting Co., 197 Wash.
341, 85 P.2d 264. Olivas v. Weiner, 274 P.2d at 478, 479.
University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, 104 Idaho at 175, 657 P.2d at 472 (1982).
Finally, this Court quoted from a Washington case stating, "Similarly, in Earle v.
Froedtert Grain & jlvfalting Co., supra, the court stated that '[t]he limitation prescribed by the
new statute commenced when the cause of action was first subjected to the operation of the
statute, that is, upon its effective date.' 85 P.2d at 266."
The reasoning of University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence, has been
followed by Idaho's appellate courts in cases involving Idaho Code § 14-4902, Idaho's version
of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act [UPCPA]. Esquivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 391,
913 P.2d 1160, 1161 (1996); Afartinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 534, 944 P.2d 127, 13 l(Ct. App.
6

1997); LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 389-90, 807 P.2d 66, 68-69 (Ct. App. 1991); and

1\1ellinger v. State, 113 Idaho 31, 32, 740 P.2d 73,74 (Ct. App. 1987). Effective July 1, 1979, the
UPCPA was amended to provide a five-year limitation period for filing an application for postconviction relief. Prior to 1979, the UPCPA, like Idaho Code § 31-857 prior to 2009, had no
period of limitations at all. In Mellinger, the Idaho Court of Appeals decided the issue of whether
the five-year limitation period mandated by the amendment applied to a conviction entered
before the effective date of the amendment. In finding that it did, the Court of Appeals cited and
followed University of Utah Hosp. on Behalf of Harris v. Pence agreeing with the district court
that the five-year period of limitations for filing an application began on the date of July 1, 1979,
the effective date of the amended statute. The Court of Appeals stated further that the
amendment was being applied prospectively because retroactive application of such a time
limitation would be contrary to general principles of law and Idaho Code § 73-101. Mellinger v.

State, 113 Idaho 31, 33-34, 740 P.2d 73, 74-75 (Ct. App. 1987).
Thus, following the reasoning of this Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals the statute of
limitations in the amendment to Idaho Code § 31-857 should be considered to have begun
running on the date of enactment with regard to all previously enacted herd districts. Therefore,
Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Ordinance that was decided by trial prior to the enactment of
the period of limitations in the amendment to I.C. § 31-857 should not be barred by the
limitation. To do so would unfairly penalize litigants, including Mr. Piercy, for failure to comply
with a statute of which he had no notice.
Respondent Guzman attempts to rely upon the case of Chase Securities Corporation v.

Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 S. Ct. 1137 (1945) in arguing that the statute of limitations in the
amended I.C. § 31-857 should bar Mr. Piercy from challenging the 1982 Ordinance. However,
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the facts in Chase are distinguishable from the facts in our case. In Chase, Plaintiff Donaldson
wanted to rescind a purchase of securities as void under the Minnesota Blue Sky Laws.
Defendant Chase argued that the action was barred by the existing statute of limitations.
Defendant argued that once it had a decision in its favor, the state legislature could not revive
Plaintiff's cause of action and put a new statute of limitations in place. The new statute of
limitations allowed actions under the Blue Sky Laws to be brought within six years after delivery
of the securities, or where delivery had occurred more than five years prior to the effective date
of the act, one year after the date of enactment.
The U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in the initial
appeal, had ruled only that the Blue Sky Law six-year statute of limitations had not been tolled
on the grounds that Chase was absent from the state. All other issues were remanded without
prejudice to the trial court. While the proceedings were pending in the trial court, the Minnesota
legislature amended the Blue Sky Law adding a specific statute of limitation applicable to
actions raised by plaintiff in the suit based on violations of the Blue Sky Laws as above. The
effect of the amendment was to abolish any defenses Chase might make under the previous
statute of limitation. In a second appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that securities had
to be registered, and this was violated by the sale. It also held that the action was one for
damages in tort to recover the purchase price of unregistered securities, that the newly enacted
statute of limitations was applicable, and that this had the effect of lifting the bar of the general
limitation statute, and in doing so, did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The U. S. Supreme Court held that as the case stood in the state court, Chase's statutory
immunity was not fully judged. Thus, the action of the legislature in amending the statute of
limitations did not deprive it of a judgment in its favor. The Supreme Court relied upon the case

8

of Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 62, 5 S.Ct. 209 (1385), which had held that a lapse of time had not
invested a party with title to real or personal property, and a state legislature, consistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment, may repeal or extend a statute of limitations, even after the right of
action had been barred. The plaintiff was then restored his remedy, and the defendant was
deprived of his defense that the action was barred by the previous statute of limitations. The
Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of state legislation void merely because it has some
retrospective operation.
The facts in Chase were that a securities purchaser tried to get his money back because
defendant sold him unregistered securities. Purchaser waited longer that the general statute of
limitations to bring his action against defendant. While the case was pending, the state legislature
amended the specific securities statute oflimitation to, in effect revive plaintiff's cause of action.
In our case, instead of reviving a cause of action, Respondents would have this Court extinguish
the defense of Mr. Piercy by retroactively applying a newly enacted statute of limitations when
Mr. Piercy had no notice of the statute. In addition, instead of a case pending on procedural
motions prior to a trial, as in Chase, in our case, there has been a full trial and a decision by the
finder of fact and law, Judge Petrie. Both the facts and the application of the law in Chase are
distinguishable from the facts and law in the present case. Chase should not be followed.
The net effect of the 2009 amendment to I.C. § 31-857 is to extend the Canyon County
Commissioners' liability on the 1982 Ordinance for seven years until 2016. The amendment to
I.C. § 31-857 is not retroactive not only because there is no evidence of legislative intent to do
so, but because Idaho's appellate courts have ruled that it is prospective beginning on the date of
its enactment on July 1, 2009.
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Based upon the law and facts, Mr. Piercy requests this Court find that the statute of
limitations in amended I.C. § 31-857 does not prevent Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982
Ordinance or rescind Judge Petrie's decision following the trial on the merits that the 1982
Ordinance is void.

III. THE CATCH-ALL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN I.C. § 5-224 DOES NOT
PREVENT MR. PIERCY FROM CHALLENGING THE 1982 ORDINANCE
Idaho Code § 5-224 does not apply to Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Ordinance because
( 1) a more specific statute controlled the issue of challenging districts; (2) the application of LC. §

5-224 would lead to an absurd result and (3) statutes of limitation do not apply to affirmative
defenses.

A.
The Pre-2009 Version of I.C. § 31-857 Exclusively Controlled the Time Frames for
Bringing Challenges to Ordinance Involving Districts
Idaho Code § 5-201, states, "Civil actions can only be commenced within the periods

prescribed in this chapter after the cause of action shall have accmed, except when, in special

cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute." I.C. § 5-224 (2012) (Emphasis added).
Also, this Court has stated the rule that courts apply the more specific statute of limitations when
there is more than one which could apply. Farmers Nat'!. Bank v. Wickhap Pipeline, 114 Idaho
565, 569, 759 P.2d 71, 75 (1988).
The Idaho Legislature chose to create a special statute governmg the procedure for
challenges to the different district ordinances enacted by counties. This statute is I.C. § 31-857.
As discussed extensively by all parties in the briefing, I.C. § 31-857 prior to the 2009
amendment contained a specific time limitation to challenges to the formation, modification or
dissolution of various districts. The time limitation forced litigants challenging the procedural
requirements of a county ordinance to face a presumption of validity after two years had passed
10

since the ordinance's enactment.

The burden of challengers to overcome a presumption of

validity is a significant protection to an existing ordinance.
Despite having specifically limited challenges to county ordinances regarding districts,
the Idaho Legislature did not place any other time limitation on challenging the ordinances. The
lack of any absolute time bar in the pre-2009 I.C. § 31-857 shows the Idaho Legislature's
intention that the two-year limitation in I.C. § 31-857 was the only statutory time limitation to
challenges to county ordinances affecting districts.
Respondents argue that the lack of an absolute time barring limitation in the pre-2009 I.C.
§ 31-857 meant that the Idaho Legislature intended for such challenges to be limited by I.C. § 5224. The Idaho Legislature, however, made its contrary position clear in the matter when they
adopted the 2009 amendment to I.C. § 31-857.
Judge Ford, Respondents, and Mr. Piercy have cited extensively to the legislative history
of the 2009 amendment to LC.§ 31-857. Mr. Piercy agrees that it is clear the Idaho Legislature
felt the need to adopt an additional statute of limitations that would establish an absolute time bar
on challenges to county ordinances involving districts. The undisputed purpose of the Idaho
Legislature was to limit "unreasonably delayed legal challenges to the procedures used by the
County Commission ... " Appendix B to Appellant's Brief.
Based upon the Idaho Legislature's actions and stated purpose, it would be absurd to
think that the legislature was trying to prevent delayed legal challenges by changing the
applicable statute of limitation from a four-year statute of limitation to a seven-year statute of
limitation. It would be embarrassing and futile to find that the Idaho Legislature is spending
time, effort and tax dollars to create legislation that operates in opposition to its stated purpose.
The Idaho Legislature certainly recognized that under the current laws there was no statute of
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limitations that created an absolute time bar to challenges to county ordinances involving
districts and therefore passed legislation amending LC. § 31-857 to create one.

Any other

interpretation of the legislature's actions in this regard would defy logic.
Further, the history of the passage of LC. § 31-857 also shows that there was no
limitation barring challenges to ordinances prior to the enactment of I.C. § 31-857. Idaho Code §
31-857 was originally enacted in 1935. See: Appendix A. LC. § 31-857 when originally enacted
stated that after five years, there would be a presumption of validity of county ordinances. Id. It
was not until 1989 that limit was changed to two years.
Idaho Code § 5-224 was previously designated as R.C. § 4060. See: Appendix B.
Revised Codes § 4060 was also a four year catch-all statute of limitation and it pre-dated the
1935 enactment ofl.C. § 31-857.

If I.C. § 5-224 or its previous enactments applied to challenges to districts created by
counties, then the enactment of I.C. § 31-857 would have been meaningless. For this statute
would create a presumption of validity for ordinances that would take effect one year after I.C. §
5-224 would apply.

Therefore, the statute of limitations would prevent challenges to the

ordinance before the presumption of validity would come into effect.
It is clear from the legislative history that the Idaho Legislature never intended to have
I.C. § 5-224 apply to challenges to county ordinances or any other law. Mr. Piercy requests that
this Court find that I.C. § 5-224 does not apply to Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Ordinance.

B.

The Application of Idaho Code § 5-224 to Challenges to Void Ordinances Should not
be Allowed.
This Court has held that, "The Court interprets statutes according to their plain, express
meaning, but will resort to judicial construction when the statute is 'ambiguous, incomplete,
absurd, or arguably in conflict with other laws.' Id. This Court disfavors a statutory construction
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that would lead to absurd or umeasonably harsh results. Id. at 690, 85 P.3d at 666." Ada County

Highway District v. TS!, 145 Idaho 360, 368, 179 P.3d 323, 331 (2008).
Respondents argue that I.C. § 5-224 would prevent all procedural and substantive
challenges to statutes and ordinances after four years. Surely if the Idaho Legislature had meant
to take such a drastic step in limiting the rights of citizens to challenge flawed and void laws, it
would have specifically set forth that limitation and not left it to a vague catch-all statute of
limitation.
Respondents cite the case of Canady v. Coeur d'Alene Lumber Co., 21 Idaho 77, 120 P.
830 (1911) in support of their position that I.C. § 5-224 would apply to bar challenges to the
present challenge to the 1982 Ordinance. At first blush, Canady seems to bear a resemblance to
the present case in that a property owner was challenging a city ordinance based partially upon
there being no citizen petition or means whereby damages could be ascertained as required by
the Idaho Code. Id. at 86, 120 P. at 839. The city in part, was claiming that the property owner's
claims were barred by estoppel and statutes of limitation. Id. This is where the similarities end.
A close reading of the opinion's analysis shows that it is unhelpful in our present case.
Before reaching any reasoning regarding the statutes of limitation, this Court reasoned
that the action taken by Coeur d'Alene was not the type of action that required a petition by the
property holders. Id. at 87, 120 P. at 840. After citing the statute that required a property owner
petition where a city sought to sell or convey a street or alley, the opinion stated, "We do not
understand this to be a case where the city has sought to sell or convey the streets and alleys
within the city, ... " Id.
The opinion also found that only property owners that abutted the streets or alleys to be
vacated could bring the type of claim for damages that was being attempted and that the
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Appellant was not such a property owner. Id. at 89, 120 P. at 842.
It was only after deciding the issue on other grounds that the opinion discussed the raised
statutes of limitation. It stated:
It is next contended that appellant's cause of action, if she had one, was barred by
the statute of limitations, subd. 1 of sec. 4054 and secs. 4037, 4038 and 4060, Rev.
Codes. We think under the facts of this case that this action is barred by the statute of
limitations, and that this action should have been brought at least within five years from
the date such cause of action arose.

Id. at 93, 120 P. at 846. The opinion does not state which statute of limitation it applied nor does
it provide any further reasoning for its rule.

This part of the opinion is certainly dicta

considering entire matter was decided upon other grounds. It is also unhelpful to the present
case in that the opinion cited a five-year statute of limitation where the catch-all statute is a fouryear limitation.

Also, since the opinion had already held that the city did not violate any

procedural requirements in enacting the ordinance, the application of the statutes of limitation
would only refer to the damage claim of the property owner. Therefore, this Court's dicta does
not create precedent. It is not persuasive in analyzing the present case where we are dealing with
a void ordinance. The Respondents cannot rely upon Canady for their argument that I.C. § 5224 should apply to the present case.
Therefore, Mr. Piercy requests that this Court find that the 1982 Ordinance was void and
that I.C. § 5-224 does not apply to challenges to the enforcement of void ordinances.

C. Statutes of Limitation do not Apply to an Affirmative Defense
Idaho cases have held that statutes of limitation do not apply to pure defenses, but are
applicable only where affirmative relief is sought. Alorton v. Whitson, 45 Idaho 28, 260 P. 426
(1927). This Court stated:
The general rule is that the statutes of limitation are not applicable to defenses. . . . And
where the defendant in an action on a note pleads total failure of consideration, and
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alleges a parol warranty of property for which the note was given, the plaintiff cannot
avoid the defense by insisting on the statute of limitations. (Citation omitted).

Id., 45 Idaho at 33, 260 P. at 427.
Mr. Piercy answered Mr. Guzman's complaint with an affirmative defense. Mr. Piercy
did not ask for affirmative relief until required to do so when the declaratory judgment action
was ordered to be filed by Judge Petrie. Appellant's Brief at p. 3-4.
Respondents only response to these facts is that Mr. Piercy did end up requesting
affirmative relief. This was not Mr. Piercy's action, but Judge Petrie's. Mr. Piercy's defense
was that there was no valid herd district ordinance that required him to keep his cattle contained.
The defense was then made as a matter of a motion for summary judgment. Judge Petrie then
ordered that a separate declaratory relief action be filed to require a trial on the validity of the
1982 Ordinance.

Mr. Piercy should not be penalized for being forced into a situation where his affirmative
defense became a separate trial. This discussion not only shows the injustice that would occur if

Mr. Piercy is not allowed his defense, but supports the arguments below regarding Respondents'
waiver of any statute of limitation defenses. Respondents encouraged the district court to delay
ruling on Mr. Plercy' s motion for summary judgment and then sat by while the Court ordered a
separate trial on the issue of the validity of the 1982 herd district ordinance. In fact, it was
Respondent Sutton that insisted that the district court order Canyon County to be a party in the
trial regarding the validity of the 1982 Ordinance. R. Vol. 2, p. 274-275. The district court
appears to have the power to order in a party and realign if necessary I.R.C.P. l 9(a)(l).
Judge Petrie even acknowledged that "in hindsight" he should have just granted Mr.
Piercy' s motion for summary judgment based upon Mr. Piercy' s affirmative defense. R., Vol. 6,
p. 968.
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Mr. Piercy therefore requests that this Court find that LC. § 5-224 does not apply to Mr.
Piercy's affirmative defense regarding the validity of the 1982 Ordinance.

IV. RESPONDENTS WAIVED THEIR STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSES
Judge Ford and the Respondents incorrectly analyze the issue of waiver (1) regarding the
Respondents' initial waiver of their statute of limitation defenses, (2) regarding the stipulation
and order barring defenses regarding the timing of the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief
and (3) the effect of having allowed the trial on the merits of the 1982 Ordinance without
objecting to timeliness.

A.
The Respondents Waived any Statute of Limitation Defenses Barring Mr. Piercy from
Challenging the 1982 Ordinance.
As set forth in detail in the Appellant Brief, the Respondents failed to raise LC. § 5-224
or any other statute of limitation that would prevent Mr. Piercy's challenge until one month prior
to the trial and after the parties had entered into a stipulation to reorder the parties and Judge
Petrie issued an order adopting the language of the stipulation. Appellant's Brief, p. 2-11.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) states: "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively ... statute of limitations .... " Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(h) states: "In
pleading the statute of limitations it is sufficient to state generally that the action is barred, and
allege with particularity the Session Law of the section of the Idaho Code upon which the pleader
relies."
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that, "Under the civil rules, compliance with the
governing statute of limitations is not a requirement for subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the time
bar of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may be waived if it is not pleaded by
the defendant." Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788, 791, 992 P.2d 783, 786 (Ct.App. 1999).
The Respondents all had multiple opportunities to raise any statutes of limitation to prevent
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the challenge to the 1982 Ordinance, but it was not until a month before the trial on the merits that
they raised a statute of limitations defense. The Respondent's did not offer any evidence of the
statute of limitations at trial. The evidence is clear that prior to the stipulation entered into by the
parties on September 4, 2008, the Respondents had not raised a statute of limitations as a defense
barring Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982 Ordinance.
Respondent Sutton attempts to argue that somehow arguing equitable estoppel and !aches
preserved the Respondents' ability to raise statute of limitations defenses. Defendant/Respondent
/Cross-Appellant Jennifer Sutton's Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 9. This point actually
bolsters Mr. Piercy' s position. Respondent Sutton is admitting that the Respondents had many
opportunities to raise defenses relating to the timing of Mr. Piercy's challenge to the 1982
Ordinance. The fact that Respondents raised defenses of estoppel and laches underscores the fact
that they should have raised any other defenses regarding timing long before a month before the
trial on the merits.
Therefore, Respondents had certainly waived their statute of limitation defenses prior to the
stipulation of September 4, 2008.

B.
The Plain Language of the Stipulation to Realign the Parties and the Judge's
Subsequent Order is an Express Waiver of any Statute of Limitation Defenses.
The critical question is whether the stipulation and subsequent order of the district court
adopting the stipulation revive the waived claims. Judge Ford and Respondents incorrectly analyze
the interpretation and effect of the stipulation and order. Judge Ford and Respondents both took the
approach of combining an analysis of the plain language of the stipulation and order with an
analysis of the possible intent behind the stipulation and order. Judge Ford is required to have
looked at the plain language and only looked at the intent if the plain language was ambiguous.
The plain language of Judge Petrie's order that adopted the parties' stipulation is as follows:
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1.
That the parties to the Action for Declaratory Judgment filed by Co-Defendant
Sutton against Canyon County on October 15, 2007 be changed to reflect Dale Piercy as
Plaintiff and Canyon County, Luis Guzman and Jennifer Sutton as Defendants.
2.
That Mr. Piercy be allowed to file an Amended Action for Declaratory Relief
attached hereto as Exhibit A;
3.
That the suit created by Mr. Piercy' s filing of the Amended Action for Declaratory
Relief remains combined with the above-captioned action between Plaintiff Guzman and
Co-Defendant Sutton and Piercy;
4.
That Canyon County, Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton may Answer the Amended
Action for Declaratory Relief filed by Mr. Piercy as provided for in the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure;
5.
That all rulings, orders, decisions and scheduling dates and deadlines which have
been entered by the Court in the above-captioned case be applied to the action created by
Dale Piercy's filing of the Amended Action for Declaratory Relief as they applied to the
original Action for Declaratory Relief filed by Co-Defendant Sutton;
6.
That Canyon County, Mr. Guzman and Ms. Sutton waive any defenses they may
have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory
Relief.

R., Vol. 4, p. 671-672.
The plain language of this order allows the defending parties to file answers. Judge Ford
found that this meant that Respondents could include whatever defenses were available in their
answers. Looking at the plain language of paragraph four by itself, Judge Ford's interpretation
would be justified. That interpretation, however, ignores the more specific language of paragraph 6
that causes a waiver of "any defenses they may have regarding the timing of the filing of Mr.
Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief." Id If you take the common meaning of the
words in paragraph 6, their meaning would encompass statutes oflimitation defenses.
It is the same with paragraph 5.

While paragraphs 2 and 3 read by themselves would

suggest that a new action is being initiated that would allow the parties to start over with a new
litigation; paragraph 5 limits that by applying all rulings, orders and decisions to the new action.
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The prior orders include discovery limits, motion limits and a trial schedule that includes a trial
beginning a month from the order. The prior orders also included Judge Petrie's order that the
legitimacy of the 1982 Ordinance be determined by a trial on the merits with Canyon County as a
defendant.
Judge Petrie's order allows for the parties to be realigned and for those parties to draft their
own pleadings, but then limits the action to the san1e issues that existed prior to the order.
An analysis of the facts beyond the plain language of the stipulation and order also shows
that neither the parties to the stipulation or Judge Petrie, intended to create new issues or to resurrect
waived issues. As stated previously, the subject stipulation and order were filed about one month
prior to the trial. The district court had already rnled on a motion to reconsider the equitable
estoppel and laches issues (R. Vol. 4, p. 572-592) and Mr. Piercy's motion regarding other legal
challenges to the 1982 Ordinance. R. Vol. 4, p. 593-595. The parties had already filed their pretrial memorandums. R. Vol. 4, p. 599-661. Not one of the Respondents included any indication
that they would be raising statute of limitations defenses to attempt to prevent Mr. Piercy from
challenging the validity of the 1982 Ordinance.
The facts show without a doubt that the issues regarding the 1982 Ordinance had, for more
than a year, been painstakingly litigated and reduced to the sole question of whether the evidence
showed that the Canyon County Commissioners had illegally attempted to create a herd district in
1982. After all this time and litigation it would defy all reason to think that Judge Petrie or the
parties involved intended to enter into a stipulation that would create a entirely new line of defenses
or issues just prior to trial. Especially where there was no provision for additional discovery or
motion practice.
Mr. Piercy, therefore, requests that this Court find that the stipulation and subsequent order
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did not resurrect or allow Respondents to raise statute of limitation defenses.

C.
Respondents \Vaived any Statutes of Limitation Defenses by Failing to Raise them at
the Trial.
Even had the Respondents Guzman and Sutton timely raised a statute of limitations defense
by filing it in their answers to Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for Declaratory Relief, they waived
those defenses at the trial on the merits.
Respondent Guzman and Sutton filed their answers to Mr. Piercy's Amended Action for
Declaratory Relief on September 19, 2008 and September 23, 2008, respectively. The trial was set
for October 8, 2008. None of the Respondents made any motion in limine or other motion to
prevent Mr. Piercy from proceeding to present his challenge to the 1982 Ordinance at trial.
At the trial, the Judge started by making a statement and Mr. Piercy's counsel argued a
motion in limine. Tr. p. 83-102. Mr. Piercy's counsel made opening statements. Tr. p. 102-109.
Respondent Guzman's attorney then made opening statements. Tr. p. 110-115. At no time during
these opening proceedings did Respondents make an objection or motion claiming that Mr. Piercy
should not be allowed to proceed because the challenge was time barred by a statute of limitations.
Evidence was submitted by stipulation and by live testimony. None of the evidence or
testimony regarded statutes of limitation defenses. Tr., p. 116-188. Canyon County then made an
opening statement and additional evidence was taken by live testimony.
Respondent Guzman then called a witness.

Tr., p. 215-227.

Tr. p. 189-214.

Following the bulk of the live

testimony, the parties engaged in extensive discussions with the Judge regarding other witnesses
and potentially other evidence. Tr. 228-248. Eventually, all parties rested and the trial was ended.
At no time during any of the trial proceedings, did any of the Respondents object to Mr. Piercy
challenging the statute or presenting evidence to challenge the 1982 Ordinance because of a statute
of limitations.
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This Court has held that waiver is, "the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is a
voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some
right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have demanded and insisted
upon." Hecla J\;fin. Co. v. Star-A1orning }lfin. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P .2d 1192, 1196 (1992).
Based upon the above record of the pre-trial proceedings and trial proceedings, the
Respondents by clear, knowing, intentional and unambiguous action waived any argument they had
with regard to statutes of limitation by participating without objection to the trial on the merits of the
1982 Ordinance. It is not surprising that Judge Petrie ignored the statute of limitations arguments in
Respondents' post-trial briefing in his decision finding the 1982 Ordinance void. At that point, the
statute of limitations arguments were completely irrelevant, because they had been waived. It
would be unjust to allow a party after the evidence is closed at a trial to argue a statute of limitations
defense that was not brought up during the trial.
It should be noted that from the point in time that Respondents Guzman and Sutton raised
the statute of limitations arguments in their post-trial briefing, Mr. Piercy has consistently objected
to their attempt to make those arguments. Mr. Piercy has always claimed that these arguments were
improper and has not consented in Judge Ford's decision to consider them.
Therefore, even if Judge Petrie's order regarding the Amended Action for Declaratory
Relief allowed the Respondents to raise statutes of limitation defenses, the Respondents waived
those defenses by failing to raise them at trial, or making any such objection at trial.

V. THE UNIQUE PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENT OF THIS CASE MAKES
RESPONDENTS GUZMAN'S AND SUTTON'S STATUTES OF LIMITATION
ARGUMENTS IRRELEVANT
The facts in the record undisputedly show that Respondent Canyon County never raised the
statute of limitations defense under LC. § 31-857 or LC. § 5-224. Based upon the cases cited above,
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Respondent Canyon County thereby waived those defenses. It is also undisputed that Respondent
Canyon County was a wholly separate party from Respondents Guzman and Sutton. The record
shows that Respondent Canyon County was specifically brought into the case in order to defend its
ordinance.

Respondent Canyon County was originally the only defendant in the declaratory

judgment action.

See, Tr. p. 43, L. 18-25 and Tr. p. 44-49 (colloquy between counsel for

Defendant Sutton and Judge Petrie on bringing Canyon County into the case); R. Vol. 3, p. 445,
468 (Order Denying Defendant Percy's Motion for Summary Judgment, Joining Canyon County,
and Holding all Other Motions in Abeyance Until Canyon County's Herd District Validity is
Determined).
Once Respondent Canyon County consented to the challenge to its ordinance by Mr. Piercy,
the other Respondents' statutes of limitation arguments appear irrelevant, even assuming that they
had been properly raised. A rnling against Respondent Canyon County that the 1982 Ordinance is
void, makes it the law in Canyon County.
Respondent Sutton argues that Mr. Piercy failed to properly support this argument with case
citations. Defendant/Respondent /Cross-Appellant Jennifer Sutton's Respondent/Cross-Appellant's
Brief at 11. This appears to be a matter of first impression for this Court. Mr. Piercy could not find
any cases where a county was ordered into a case and then acquiesced in allowing a challenge to
one of its ordinances where other private persons were also parties to the lawsuit. This is simply a
matter of procedure. Mr. Piercy has cited the procedural rules and cases regarding waiver of nonjurisdictional defenses.
The uniqueness of this case is demonstrated by the irrelevance of the authority cited by
Respondent Sutton in response to Mr. Piercy's argument. Respondent Sutton cites LC. § 10-1202
and argues that it provides her the right to argue that the 1982 Ordinance is valid.
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Defendant/Respondent /Cross-Appellant Jennifer Sutton's Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief at
12. Mr. Piercy agrees. Respondent Sutton had the opportunity to argue for the 1982 Ordinance's
validity and did so the trial. Respondent Sutton's ability to argue the 1982 Ordinance's validity
under I.C. § 10-1202 is irrelevant to the question of whether a private citizen's invocation of a
statute of limitations regarding a challenge to a county ordinance is effective where the county itself
has agreed to allow the challenge to proceed to a trial on the merits. It is certain that neither
Respondent Sutton nor Guzman were representing Respondent Canyon County. The County had its
own attorney.
Therefore, Mr. Piercy requests that this Court find that Judge Petrie' s order that the 1982
Ordinance is void is the law of Canyon County and that it applies to Mr. Piercy's case.

VI. APPLYING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN l.C. § 31-857 OR LC.§ 5-224 TO
MR. PIERCY'S CHALLENGE IS PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The 2009 amendment to I.C. § 31-857 and the application of I.C. § 5-224 in this matter
would violate the substantive and procedural due process rights guaranteed by the Idaho and U.S.
Constitutions.

A.
The Application of Statute of Limitations to Ch.allenges to the 1982 Ordinance ·would
Violate Mr. Piercy's Rights to Procedural Due Process
This Court has stated: Procedural due process requires that "there must be some process to
ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal
constitutions." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917, 926
(1999); quoting: State v. Rhoades, 121Idaho63, 72, 822 P.2d 960, 969 (1991).
This Court also held, "Due process 'is not a concept to be applied rigidly in every matter.
Rather, it 'is a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by the
paiiicular situation."" Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho at 91; quoting: City of Boise v.
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Industrial Comm 'n, 129 Idaho 906, 910, 935 P.2d 169, 173 (1997); quoting: In re Wilson, 128
Idaho 161, 167, 911 P.2d 754, 760 (1996).
"A procedural due process inquiry is focused on determining whether the procedure
employed is fair. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 'prohibits deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without 'fundamental fairness' through governmental conduct that offends
the community's sense of justice, decency and fair play."' Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136,
Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001); quoting: Maresh v. State of Idaho Dep't of Health and

Welfare, 132 Idaho 221, 225-226, 970 P.2d 14, 19-20 (1998); citing: Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 432-34, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 428-29 (1986).
This Court must engage in a two-step analysis in determining whether there has been a
violation of procedural due process. Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136, Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d
1006, 1015 (2001 ). The first step is to ascertain either a liberty or property under the Idaho
Constitution or under the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Once a court has determined that a
property interest exists, it can determine what process is due. Id. A court must determine if sufficient
notice and hearing were afforded to meet the due process requirements. Simmons v. Board of

Trustees ofIndependent School Dist. No. I, 102 Idaho 552, 553, 633 P.2d 1130, 1131 (1980).
"Whether a property interest exists can be determined only by an examination of the
particular statute, rule or ordinance in question." Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 72, 28 P.3d at 1015; See

also: Fergusen v. Board of Trustees of Bonner County Sch., 98 Idaho 359, 363, 564 P.2d 971, 975
(1977).
Open range is a property right. 'Open range' is defined as all areas of the state not within
cities, villages, or already created herd districts. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 606, 990
P.2d 1213, 1217 (1999). Therefore, the default land status in Idaho is open range, when you are
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outside of a city or a village. The Idaho Legislature then allowed private citizens to change the
status of the land to a herd district through the petition process. See: I.C. § 25-2402-2404.
A herd district would require specified animals to be contained by fencing. This would
abrogate the previous right of landowners to allow their animals to roam at large. It also changed
the ability for landowners to be free of liability in the event cattle were to cause damage to other
persons' property. LC. § 25-2118. Interestingly, if the 1982 Ordinance is upheld, the only animal it
controls is swine by operation of the statutory language and the failure of the Commissioners to
identify the controlled animals in the Ordinance.
Further, a herd district allows the district to tax the members of the district in order to
construct fencing and put in livestock guards. So, the creation of a herd district also directly affects
a persons' property.
In taking away this property right, the Idaho Legislature required that counties provide
notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the property right being taken by creation of a herd
district. See: LC. § 25-2402-2404.
By providing for the right to have notice and an opportunity to be heard, Mr. Piercy should
have the right to challenge that process. Any statutes of limitation applied to his right would
eliminate that the process provided under the state herd district laws by making it impossible to
challenge the lack of the process after four or seven years had expired.
Respondents argue that a four or seven year limitation to challenges to a county ordinance
impacting districts of all kinds is reasonable. Respondent Sutton equates it to time limitations on
post-conviction

relief

actions.

Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant

Jennifer

Sutton's

Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief at 37.
This argument emphasizes the problem with the Respondents' claims. A person is certain to
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know when the clock is ticking on a post-conviction relief action, because it begins upon the date of
conviction. The person whose right is at stake would be present for the event that triggers the
statute of limitations and therefore would have actual notice. With the ordinance in question, no one
would know their rights had been impacted until it was too late to attempt to challenge the
ordinance. The actual act making the ordinance challengeable would be hidden.

In making a change to a highway district for example, county commissioners could make
the change in complete secret violating all statutory safeguards. The district could then structure the
ordinance so that the obvious effects of the passage of the ordinance would not occur for seven
years and one day from the date of passage. This would essentially ensure that no one would know
about the ordinance until it was too late to challenge. Application of any statutes of limitation to
this type of county action is inviting the worst type of government abuse, because the abused would
be powerless to challenge the ordinance.
Again, this case is the perfect example. Mr. Piercy had his right to notice, petitioner, and an
opportunity to be heard taken from him. Without realizing it, Mr. Piercy's land allegedly became a
herd district and he was now legally liable to be sued if his cows escaped his property. It became a
trap. The first time Mr. Piercy knows of the herd district is the first time he was sued in court for
damages. Now Respondents argue that it does not matter that the herd district was illegally enacted,
because Mr. Piercy' s action is barred by a vague statute of limitations or a recently enacted statute
of limitations. Preventing Mr. Piercy from challenging the 1982 Ordinance essentially creates the
recipe book for governmental abuse.

B.
Mr. Piercy's Substantive Due Process Rights \Vould be Violated by the Application of
a Statute of Limitation to His Challenge of the 1982 Ordinance.
The parties cited cases are in agreement regarding the standards for reviewing this type of
action. The arguments cited above are equally applicable to Mr. Piercy's substantive due process
26

argument. It would be incredible to think that a government could limit the ability for the citizens to
challenge illegal and void ordinances in circumstances where the abuse of process both makes the
ordinance illegal and unable to detect the defective ordinance until it is too late. The application of
statute of limitations to challenges to ordinances based upon lack of due process in the enactment is
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental function and is unconstitutional.

IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Piercy has shown that Judge Ford erred in his ruling allowing Mr. Guzman and Ms.

Sutton to raise the statutes of limitation found in LC. § 5-224 and amended LC. § 31-857 in order
to overturn Judge Petrie's ruling that the 1982 Ordinance was illegal and void. Judge Ford also
erred in finding that statutes of limitation on challenges to ordinances that effect property rights
are constitutional. For these and the above stated reasons, Mr. Piercy requests that this Court
reverse Judge Ford's rulings.

Respectfully submitted this 17 day of April 2013,

SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
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SECTION 1. 1:hat Section 29-904 Idaho Code Annotated
be and the same is hereby amended as follows :
3/!l "29-9~4. Capital . Deemed Security.-Whenever such
compai:ies shall re~eive and acc:pt the office or appointment
of assignee~, receivers, guardians, executors, administra!ors, or be d1_r~cted to execute any trust whatever, or engage
m the comp1lmg of abstracts, the capital of the said company shall be taken a~d considered as the security required
by the !aw for the faithful performance of their duties as
aforesaid, and shall be absolutely liable in case of any default whatever * ..i.. provided that it shall be the duty of the

commiSsioner of fi_nance. of ~he State of Idaho to annually
make a .thoroug!i i;ivestigation of the fiscal affairs of such
compan~es and if it be found after such examination that
the capita~ of .such company is impaired, the commissioner
of finance is giver; the power, and it is hereby made his duty,
to suspend th~ right .of such _company to make and certify
abstracts of title until su_ch time as the commissioner of fi?_tanc~ shall have determined that such capital is no longer
i_mpaired, and the commissioner of finance is hereby authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry this Act into effect."
Approved March 2, 1935.

CHAPTER78
(S. B. No. 135)

AN ACT
AMENDING SECTION 6-507 OF THE IDAHO CODE ANNOTATED
RELATING TO THE SERVICE OF WRITS OF ATTACHMENT
AND OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENTS, AND PROVIDING FOR THE METHOD, MANNER AND EFFECT OF
SUCH SERVICE ON BANKING CORPORATIONS OPERATING BRANCH BANKS OR MORE THAN ONE OFFICE WHERE
DEPOSITS ARE RECEIVED, AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY.

Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
SECTION 1. That Section 6-507 of the-Idaho Code Annotated shall be and the same is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"6-507. GARNISHMENT.-Upon receiving · informa-

c.

79 •35'
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tion in writing from the plaintiff or his attorney, that any
person or corporation, public or private, has in his possession or control, any credits .or other personal property belonging to the defendant, or is owing any debt to the defendant, the sheriff must serve upon such person, or corporation,
a copy of the writ, and a notice that such credits, or other
property, or debts, as the case may be, are attached in pursuance of such writ. Provided, that in case of service upon
a corporation the same may be had by delivering a copy
of the paper to be served, if upon a· private corporation, to
any officer or agent thereof, and if upon a public or municipal corporation, to the mayor, president of the council or
board of trustees, or any presiding officer, or to the secretary or clerk thereof. Provided, further, that :no service of
any writ of attachment, :nor of execution, nor any garnishment, shall be made under this or the preceding section, or
otherwise, on any banking or trust corporation operating
branch banks or more than o:ne office where depo sits are received, except by delivery of copies of the writs, notices
and/or other papers required in other cases, to one of the
officers or managing agents of such corporation employed in
and at, and in charge of swne particular office or branch of
said corporation, and being so made, such writ or garnishment shall be valid and effective only as to moneys to the defendant's credit in that particular office or branch and as to
other personal property belonging to the defendant held in
the possession or control of the officers or managing agents
of said corporation employed in and at, _and in charge of
sucfl, office or branch."
SECTION 2. An emergency existing therefor, which
emergency is hereby declared to exist, this Act shall be in
force and effect from and after it1? passage and approval.
Approved March 2, 1935.

CHAPTER79
(S. B. No. 114)

AN ACT
CREATING A PRIMA F ACIE LEGAL PRESUMPTION THA_T AN
ORDER OF A BOARD COUNTY COMMISSIONERS CREATING,
ESTABLISHING, DISESTABLISHING, OR DISSOLVING ANY
SCHOOL DISTRICT, ROAD DISTRICT; HERD DISTRICT, OR
OTHER DITRICT, RAS BEEN MADE PURSUANT TO . THE

APPENDIXB

c. 307 § 4055

PROCEEDINt;;S IN CIVIL ACTIONS

TIME OF COMMENCING

pouesaion of them. Havird v . Lung (1911) 19 I .
790, 115 P. 930.
Where the posseasion of property Is acquired by
a tort no demand is ntlcessary prior to the institu ~
tion of suit 'for its recovery ; consequently the
statute of limitation11 ia set in motion without such
demand. Ha.vird v . ·Lung (1911) 19 I. 790, 116
P. 930.

t ai ned in an abstract may commence his action to
recover dHmagel:I against the abstracter within three
years aft.er discovering the fraud or rohstake. Bil~
lock v. Idaho etc, Co. (1912) 22 I. 440. 126 P . 612
42 L . R. A. (N. S.) 178.
'
The test, under subd. 4, is not whether the fraud ·
or mist ake occurred in a. contract or independently ·
of contract, but the test 111 w hether the action aeeka ·

ha~:a~~ =~Piici:~io~e:to '{~:· ~:~~~i~~~ ~!kl~:.d,de~

re!lJ~d:~a~~J. o4n ::~~~~:i&"~f :if:~:~ ;:c~i~:k!~~ , ~:.,,N;,,

talning or fnjurin1t g-o"ods or chattels, the period

put a reasonably prudent per son upon inquiry ia

c. 307 § 4063

been.reciprocal demands between the parties, t he cause of action is deemed
to have accrued from the time of the last item proved in the account on
either side. [R. S. § 4058.]
Hist. (See C. C. P. ' Bl, § 162) R. S.
enacted R . C. ib.

:.f·;:!.~.~ >:

::~~1~~1~:r!:~~~~~!~~!li;. ~::~:~::~.:. :~:::;i:~~··:: ~'.~1-,,~~:i·•:i

Comp. ler.-Cal.
Kerr'a C. ib.
N. D. Similar:

Same :

i

.Applica tion: This section h a:t n o application to
fees charged by the county for recordin fl of in stru.•
ments. Lincol n Co. v. Twin F a ll:1 etc. Co. (1918 )
2S I. 439, ! SO P . 788.
·

4068, re-

C. C. P . 1872, ·§ 344;

C. C . P . § 7 879.

§ 4059.

Actions to recover deposits. To act ions brought to r ecover
money or property deposited with any bank, banker, trust company or
saving and loan society, no limit ation begins to run until after an authorized demand. [R. S. § 4059.]

personal injuries. Within two years:
Cited : Gwinn v. Melvin ( 1908) 9 I. 202, '12 P .
Hi•t. (Se• C. C. P . '81, § 163) R. S. § 4069, re961; Bates v. Cap. S. Bk. (191 0) 18 I. 429, 110
R . C. ib.
. 1. An action aipinst a sheriff'., co1:'oner ~r consta~le, upon .the ~iability g,;~.it .· enact.ed
P. 277.
Corns>. le!f.-Cal.' No such p r ovision in C. C. P.
mcurred by the domg of an act m his official capacity, and m virtue of' :~v:<!·: '. 1872 : differe nt : K err'a C. § 348.
·his office, or by the omission of an official duty, including- the nonpayment Vi'iff;:
§ 4060. Actions for other relief. An · action for relief not herein·of money collected upon an execution.
:.\j~',;; :·
before provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause
2. An action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, where the ' :/it~)':. of action shall have accrued. [R. S. § 4060.]
action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, except }'.i':,'
Hiat. (See C. C. P . '81, § 164) R. S. § 4060, re·
.Acth>n a1ain•t officer: An action by a county
to r ecover from t he cler k of court, auditor and rewhen the statute imposing it prescribes a different limitation.
··'f~t1< ' "enactad R. C. ib.
Comp. leK.-Ca l. Same; C . C. P . 1872, § 34.3;
:ts~i~n:~n~~s t~~e~~1!k. a~~~~~n~Y
iif~~~Y c~~=
3. An action upon a statute or upon an undertaking in a criminal )f
Kerr' s C. ib.
lected bY. the clerk, etc., from t h e county, i11 baned
action for a forfeiture or penalty to a county or to the people of the state. -~f1).1
N . D. Analogous : C. C. P. § 7881.
a fter four years. Bannock Co. ·v. Bell (1901) 8 I.
Cited: R e Counties v. Alturas Co. (1894) 4 I .
l, 65 P . 710.
L! . An action to recover damages for an injury to the person, or for
Appuintment of ;idmint.trat or:
A ·proceeding
146, 37 P. 349 ; Chemung M. Co. v. Hanley (1904 )
the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.
fl I. 786, 77 P . 226; N elson v. Steele (1906) 12 I.
f or t he appointment ot an administrator h an ac762, 88 P. 96: Kill v . Emvire State etc. Co. (1908)
tion w ithin the meaning of thi11 section e.nd it is
5. An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment
168 F . 881, 885; Hailey v. R iley ( 1908) 14 I. 4.81, · barred if not commenced within four y ears from
96 P. 686, 17 L . R. A. (If. S.) 86; Bashor v. Beloit
the death of the decedent. Gwinn v. Melvin (19 03)
or seduction.
(lHl) 20 I. 692, 119 P . 66; C anady v. Coeur
9 I. 202, 72 P . 961.
. 6. An action against a sheriff or other officer for the escape . of a
d' Alene L . Co. (1911) 21 I. 77. 120 P. 830 ; (erroActicm11 for dHrna&es : A ction s for damages ag ainst
neously a s § 464) O lympia etc. Co. v . Kerns ( 1913)
r eal p roperty come und er this section. Bo ise Dev .
prisoner arrested or imprisoned on civil process. ('03, p. 56, § 1.)

.

f:::

'81, § 169). R. S. I 4066; am.
R. C. § 4056.
Comp. leg.-Cal. See C. C. P. 1872, § 339; ais
nmcndecl : Kerr's 0. ib.
If. D. Analogous: C. C. P. §§ 7376,-8.
Jli»t.

·oa,

(See

·c. C. P.

C ross ref. Claims again s t state two y ears; § 109.
Cited ; Collman v . Wanamaker (1915) 27 I . 842
346, 149 ~·. 292 ; Pindel v. R'olga.t e (1916) 221 F:
342, 137 C. C. A. 168, 348, Ann. Oas. 19160 98S.

p. 56, § I. reenacted

§ 4056. Actions to recover goods or money from officer~.
one year: An action against an officer or officer de facto:
1. To recover any goods, wares; merchandise or other property seized ~-·
by any.. such officer in his official capacity as tax collector, or to recover ;:
the price or value of any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal-.r"
property so seized, or for damages for the seizure, detention, sale of or~;
inj ury to, any goods, wares, merchandise or other personal property seized,
.or for damages done to any person or property in making any such seizure'.,"'.·-1n .....~-·
2. For money paid t o any such officer under protest or seized by such :
officer in his official capacity· as a collector of taxes, and which, it is::'•
claimed, ought to be refunded. [R. S. § 4056.]
'·
·d
Hist. (See C. C. P. '81, § 160) R. S. § 4066, r eenacted R. a. lb.
Comp. lea-.-Cal. AlmoHt identical except time

Croaa ref. R ecovery o:l fine1:1 in police courts one:·
year : § 2221.
·•.'

is six. m onths: C. C. P. 1872, § 341; as amended.
same through subd. 1 : Kerr's C. ib.

-~~ •
··1· q,

.

§ 4057. Actions on claims against county. ·Actions on claims against? ·
a county which have . been rejected by the board of commisisoners:;·
must be commenced within six months after the first rejection thereof by;..
such board. [R. S. § 4057.]
Hi1t. (See C. C4 P. '81, § 161) R. S . § 4067, reenacted R 0. lb.
<.:omp. ler.-Cal. Same: c. a. P. 1872, I 342;
Kerr's C . ib.

Cited: Weil v . Defenbach (1918)
170 P . 103.

31 I .

24 I. 481, 496, 136 P . 256.

Co. v. Boise ( 1917 ) SO I. 675, 167 P. 10S2.

§ 4061.

Limitations apply: to state. The limitations prescr ibed in
this chapter apply to actions brought in the name of .the state, or for the
.benefit of the state, in the same manner as t o actions by private parties.
[R. S. § 4061.]
action on behu.lf of a cou nty to compel the com··
m issioners oi an other county to a p1loint an <1.ccountant for the a i;)portion m e nt ot the indebtedne111:1
of the counties as prescribed by a cou nty divi~ion
act. R e Co1mties v . Alturad Co. . (189 4) 4 I. 146,
37 P. 349.
Action by county: The statute runs against t he
county in a. civil action brought b y it against t ho
clerk, a uditor and recorder for lllegal fees und
compensation collected by him from the cou nty du ring hil:I term of office. ( Overrulina- Fremont Co. v.
Brandon, 6 I. 482. 66 P . 264; Quarles, C. J. d lS?ie n tin g ) B a nnoc k Co. 'V. Be ll ( 1901) 8 I . 1, 65
P . 71 0.

Hi•L (See C. C. P. '81, § 166) R. S. § 4061,. reen ncted R . 0. i b.
Comp, le&'.-Cal. Same : C. C. P. 1872. § 345 ;
Kerr's C. ib.
N. D. Similar: C. C. P. § 7382.
Application to •tate: The s tatute of limitations
applies to t)le 11tate a.s well as to Drivat e individ·u als. Small v. S . (1904) ·10 I . 1. 76 P . 76 5.
Limitation of section : Th ls section i a specifically
rest r icted to the limitations "prescribed by thi:s
title," that is, of action s of a private n ature and
alla ins.t private individua111. It does not ~PI>b t o
an a ction t o enforce a public duty, mch as an

§ 4062. Action to redeem mortgage. An action t o redeem a mortgage of r eal property, witp. or without an account of rents and profits, may
be brought by the mortgagor or those claiming under him, against t he
mortgagee in possession, or those claiming under him, unless he or they
have continuously maintained an adverse possession of the mor tgaged
premises for five years after breach of some condition of the m ortgage.
[R. s. § 4062.J
Hbt. (See C. C. P . '81, § 166 ) R . S . i 4062, reen acted R . C. lb.
Comp. le&".-Cal. Same: C. C . P. 1872. f .346 ;
Kerr'Jt 0 . ib.

Cited:
Fountain v . L ewiston Nat.
11 I . 461, SS P . 605.

Bk, (1906}

§ 4058. Actions on open accounts. In an action brought to recover
a balance due upon a mutual, open and current account, where there hav~:;

§ 4063. Same: Partial redemption. If there is mor e than one such
mortgagor, or more than one person claiming under a mortgagor, some of
whom are not entitled to maintain such an action under the provisions of
this title, any one of them who is entitled to maintain such an action may
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